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Abstract: The Nile River Basin witnesses a long history of tension and negotiation among riparian states. There are two 
legal frameworks govern the Nile Basin. Firstly, the private legal framework reflected in legal history on the Nile. The most 
legal active period among Nile Basin states was the period between 1890
th
 and 1930
th
. The legal solutions to the Nile Basin 
problems came to an end with the end of the colonization in Africa, especially the Nile riparian states. During this period, 
the tension among liberal states took a different shape. Harmon and Nyerere doctrine were introduced among the riparian 
states. This led to the refutation of most of the private legal framework from most of the independent states. Thus, riparian 
states started to explore new legal ground to regulate their relationship. On the other hand, the public legal framework 
represented in the work of the International Law Association, which started with Helsinki rules in 1966, and the 1997 UN 
Convention. Many scholars argue that the legal solution is the best one for the Nile question, based on the previous 
frameworks. However, this note argued that the international legal framework governing the international rivers generally 
and the Nile specifically cannot offer a solution to the disputes over the water of the Nile. This note discusses both the legal 
frameworks of the Nile on one hand. On the other hand, it highlights the points of indeterminacy of both frameworks to 
solve the Nile dilemma. It argues that the solutions of the present and future disputes through legal tools are not enough. 
This note goes beyond the most proposed recommendation to form a comprehensive treaty as the solution to the riparian 
problems. It asserts that the law is not a tool to end the states tension, rather than it is a tool to persevere good faith and 
prevent future dispute. A main role of the extra legal solutions must be played. It based its argument on substantive and 
formulate dilemma in the previous frameworks. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between Egypt and surrounding states is 
becoming more strained by the day. The demand of lower 
riparian states is increasing in regards to their share of the 
Nile water. These rising demands have caused political 
clashes among the riparian states, especially Egypt and 
Sudan from the upper riparian, and Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
Kenya from the lower riparian states. This tension reached 
its peak when President Sadat declared that Egypt would be 
ready to go to war against Ethiopia, if it harms Egypt’s 
interests in Nile water.
1
To maintain the status quo, many 
                                                             
/1/ TesfayeTafesse, The Hydropolitical Assessment of the Nile Question: An 
Ethiopian Perspective, 26 WATER INT’L 1, 2001, 4, See also, JuttaBrunnee 
and Stephen Troope, The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law Matter?, 
43 HARV. INT’L L.REV. 105, 106. [Hereinafter Does Law Matter] See aslo 
Sadat to Ethiopia: Leave Nile alone or it’s war, The Gazette Montréal , 
scholars proposed a legal solution as one of the strong 
propositions in this case.
2
 However, none of them offered 
an answer of why or how these states will enter in a new 
treaty regarding the Nile issues, especially given that some 
of them persisted on their acquired right to and share of the 
Nile water. I argue here that the Nile legal frameworks as 
they are interpreted cannot help the Nile Basin states to 
enter in a legal agreement unless under the existence of 
                                                                                                     
Saturday June 7, 1980, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1946&dat=19800607&id=IYkx
AAAAIBAJ&sjid=caQFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1030,2287901 Last visit 
24/12/2011 
/2/ TakeleSobokaBulto, Between Ambivalence and Necessity: Occlusions 
on the Path Towards a Basin Wide Treaty in the Nile Basin, 20 COLO. J. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. &POL'Y 291 2008-2009, 318.[hereinafter  Ambivalence 
and Necessity] See also, Christina M. Carroll, Past and Future Legal 
Framework of the Nile River Basin, 12 GEO. INT’LENVTL. L. REV. 269, 
199-2000, 282.  
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other factors, whether economic or political. 
This paper is concerned with a certain legal occurrence, 
where there is a need to reach a new legal agreement in 
response to the existing dispute related to the current legal 
issues. The argument will be limited to the question of how 
this dispute affects  the formulation of a new law. In other 
words, the thesis tackles the transition period between the 
old and new legal systems. The main question here and 
what I am trying to spread in my thesis is: “Is the existing 
legal framework fit to be a base for the new legal order of 
the Nile?” The answer is no, as I presented the Nile Basin 
states’ argument, which they maintained – each from its 
own perspective- that such an argument is the suitable one. 
First, I present the Egyptian Legal argument, which is 
based on the historical and acquired rights of Egypt. 
Second, I tackle the issue of the Nyerere Doctrine, which 
leads me to discuss the issue of state succession and 
conflict between state continuity and state autonomy. 
Thirdly, I argue that the conflict between Sovereignty and 
Cooperation in the international water law is inevitable. 
2. Overview of the Nile Legal Issues 
2.1. Legal Framework of the Nile Basin State 
2.1.1. Introduction 
The controversial positions of states and scholars’ 
position can be summarized in three main points. First, 
Egypt and Sudan accept the Nile conventions and consider 
them as acquired rights.
3
 Secondly, Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
Tanzania refuse both acquired and historical rights, and 
they consider them to be a colonial conspiracy against the 
lower riparian states,
4
 Thirdly, Congo, Uganda, and 
Rwanda accept the conventions, albeit after long 
negotiations with Egypt and Sudan, in order to take 
personal advantages.
5
 Finally, Eritrea is an observer to 
previous states, and did not have any inclination to join 
                                                             
/3/ Valerie Knobelsdorf, Note: The Nile Water Agreements: Imposition and 
Impacts of a Transboundary Legal System, 44 COLUM J. TRANSNATL. L. 
634. 635 
/4/ See, Christina M. Carroll, Supra note 2 at 139, DerejeZelekeMekonnen, 
The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the 
Adoption of a Water Security Paradigm: Flight Into Obscurity or a 
Logical Cul-de-sac? 21EUR. J. INT’L.2, (2010), [hereinafter The Nile 
Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations], see also, 
DerejeZelekeMekonnen, Between the Scylla of water security and 
Charybdis of Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework 
Agreement- Failed or Just teetering on the Brink?,GO. J. INT’ L. 3 (2011), 
{hereinafter Benefit Sharing], see, TakeleSobokaBulto, Between 
Ambivalence and Necessity: Occlusions on the Path Toward A Basin – 
Wide Treaty in the Nile Basin, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVIRL. L. &POL’Y 291, 
(2008-2009) [hereinafter Between Ambivalence and Necessity], 
JuttaBrunnee. AZIZA MANSUR FAHMI, WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE NILE 
BASIN: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS, 
http://www.isgi.cnr.it/stat/pubblicazioni/sustainable/133.pdf last visit 
11/10/2011.  
/5/ Aaron Schwachach, The United Nation Convention on the Law of Non- 
Navigational uses of International watercourses, Customary International 
Law and interest of upper riparian states, 33 TEX. INT’ L. J. 257 (1998), 
270. 
either pole.
6
 
2.1.2. 1902 Treaty between Ethiopia and the United 
Kingdom 
In 1902, the King of Great Britain Edward VII and the 
Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II signed a treaty regarding 
“the delimitation of the Frontier between Ethiopia and 
Sudan,”
7
 which was part of the Egyptian territory while 
Egypt was under the British protection. The treaty was 
drafted both in English and Amharic. It consisted of five 
articles.  While the first two are related to the determination 
of the boundaries between the two states, the last two 
articles deal with the future cooperation between the two 
empires. For the River Nile, article three was the only 
article dealing with the Nile Water. 
2.1.3. 1925 Exchange Note between Italy and the United 
Kingdom 
Between 1919 and 1925, both the British and the Italian 
governments exchanged notes on building the railroad from 
Eritrea to the Italian Somaliland. The exchange confirmed 
the right of both Egypt and Sudan to their share of the Nile 
water. In return for the exchange, Great Britain asked for 
the Italian government’s recognition of such rights to 
ensure the execution of the railroad project. Italy has 
planned to build a railroad that will pass through Ethiopia, 
and the vicinity of Addis Ababa. The note was to ask the 
British colony its support to mediate between the Ethiopian 
government and the Italian Colonist.  On the other hand, 
the British government asserted in the note that building the 
railroad is attached with the declaration of the Italian 
colony with the “prior hydraulic rights” of both Egypt and 
Sudan.
8
 
2.1.4. 1929 Exchange Note between Egypt and the United 
Kingdom 
OkothOwrio, a Kenyan scholar, argued that the 1929 
note exchange was to “guarantee and facilitate an increase 
in the volume of water reaching Egypt.”
9
 However, the 
rights that this agreement guaranteed to Egypt were also 
maintained in the previous agreement. Besides, the 1929 
Exchange note between Egypt and the United Kingdom 
ensured the continuity of the assigned share of water that 
                                                             
/6/ Adams Oloo, The Quest for Cooperation in the Nile Water Conflicts: 
the Case of Eritrea, 11 AFR. SOC. REV. 95, 2007, 96. 
/7/ Preamble of the Treaty Between Ethiopia and Great Britain on the 
Delimitation of the Frontier between Ethiopia and Sudan, United Nations, 
Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of 
International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, United Nations 
Legislative Series (ST/LEG/SER.B/12), United Nations publication, 
115,116 [hereinafter United Nation Publication].   
/8/ Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Italy Respecting 
Concessions for a Barrage at Lake Tsana and a Railway  
Across Abyssinia From Eritrea To Italian Somaliland, Signed at Rome 14 
and 20 December 1925, see United Nation Publication  
Supra note 7 at 99  
/9/ OkothOwiro, The Nile Treaty, State Succession and international Treaty 
Commitments: A case Study of the Nile Water Treaty,  
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_6306-544-1-30.pdflast visit 1/4/2012.  
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reaches Egypt. 
10
 
Egyptian Scholars argued that the assassination of Sir 
Oliver Lee Stack, the British governor-general of Sudan, in 
late 1924 was the reason for concluding such a note.
11
 Later, 
after the 1925 exchange, the British authority in Sudan used 
this accident to apply pressure on the Egyptian policy in 
Sudan. It threatened the Egyptian government with 
increasing areas irrigated with the Nile River water in 
Sudan, as punishment for murdering Sir Oliver Lee Stack. 
Hence, the Egyptian government worked to develop a new 
study of the Nile River water for irrigation purposes.
12
 Thus, 
the notes between Her Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Egyptian Government on the Use of 
Waters of the Nile for Irrigation were concluded in 1929. 
The Note was between the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers Mohamed Mahmud Pasha- as a representative of 
the Egyptian government - and Lord Lloyd from the British 
government. The first paragraph of the note asserted that “a 
solution to these problems [irrigation] would not be 
deferred to a subsequent date when it became possible for 
the two Governments to come to terms on the status of the 
Sudan but, regarding the settlement of the present 
provisions, it expressly reserves every freedom at any 
negotiations which could precede such an agreement.”
13
 
Egyptian Note sent from the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers Mohamed Mahmud Pasha stated that “{t}he 
present agreement can in no way be considered as affecting 
the control of the River - this being a problem which will 
cover free discussions between the two Governments 
within the framework of negotiations on the Sudan.”
14
 The 
second paragraph was reconfirmed later in the 1959 
Convention. It asserted its acceptance to the increase of 
water quantity to Sudan without any “infringement on 
neither the natural and historical rights of Egypt.” 
15
 
The significance of 1929 Nile water agreement was 
embedded in three issues. First, Egypt ensured full control 
of any construction work on the Nile.
16
 Based on this fact, 
the Ethiopian authority was prevented from building a dam 
on the Lake Tana in 1935.
17
 Second, it changed the legal 
status of the different Nile Basin states. It had fully 
recognized the principle of equitable utilization.
18
 The 
determination of such utilization is based on finding of a 
                                                             
/10/ see United Nation Publication supra note 7 at 115  
/ 11 /YunanLabibRizk, Adiwan of Contemporary Life, Al Ahram, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/503/chrncls.htmlast visit, 1/4/2012. See 
also AZIZA MANSUR FAHMI, supra note4.   
/12/ P. P. HOWELL AND J. A. ALLAN, THE NILE: SHARING A SCARCE 
RESOURCES; A HISTORICAL AND TECHNICAL REVIEW OF WATER 
MANAGEMENT AND OF ECONOMICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES, 
Cambridge University Press, (1st ed.), (1994), 538.  
/13/ United Nation Publication supra note 7  at 101  
/14/ United Nation Publication, Id at 101 
/15/ United Nation Publication Id at 101.  
/16 /Supra note 2 at 98. 
/17/ Econ. & Soc. Commission For Western Asia, Assessment of Legal 
Aspects of the Management of Shared Water Resources in the ESCWA 
Region, ¶U.N. Doc. E/ESCW A/ENR/2001/3, (Feb. 22, 2001), 14.  
/18/ Id  at 16 
commission.
19
 Thirdly, 1929 agreement was a symbol of 
recognition of “the principle of established rights.” Egypt 
insisted on the recognition of its “natural and historic 
rights.” They have been the most fundamental elements of 
Egyptian policy approach to the Nile waters. 
2.1.5. 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan 
The High Dam (1960-1969) was built after months of 
concluding the agreement between the United Arab 
Republic and the Republic of Sudan for the full utilization 
of the Nile Water on  November 8
th
, 1959. This agreement 
was mainly held for the sake of building the High dam; it 
determined the Egyptian share in the Nile water regarding 
the Dam and its lake.
20
 
The importance of the 1959 Convention is based on 
various factors. First, 1959 put a bilateral obligation on 
both states to negotiate with other riparian states in case of 
their request to increase their water share. They did not 
exclude the other riparian states’ right to ask for future 
increases in their own share. Secondly, The Convention 
was mainly to enhance water utilization for both states. 
Additionally, it increased the water share of Sudan to 
compensate for building the high dam; the Egyptian 
government additionally paid 15 million pounds to the 
Sudanese government for any damage afflicted on the 
Sudanese territory form building the dam. Moreover, the 
Convention helped the two states to form one of the oldest 
institutional arrangements in the Nile Basin, which is the 
Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Water 
(PJTC). 
2.2. Institutional Framework of the Nile Basin States 
2.2.1. Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile 
Water (PJTC) 
The history of institutional arrangement of the Nile Basin 
started in the early 1950s. In 1959, as a part of the 1959 
Convention, Egypt and Sudan formed the Permanent Joint 
Technical Commission for Nile Water (PJTC). It is 
considered as one of the oldest arrangements for the Nile 
Basin. The reason for establishing the Commission was to 
ensure the technical cooperation for the Nile control 
projects.
21
 
This cooperation tool is a bilateral cooperative one. It did 
not include any other states from the rest of the Nile Basin 
except Egypt and Sudan.
22
 Both countries stated that for the 
best interest of the PJTC success, other Nile Basin states 
shall be involved in another big institutional arrangement. 
Hence, the result was establishing the HYDROMET project, 
which paved the road to both UNDUGU and TECCONILE 
later on. 
23
 
                                                             
/19/ AZIZA MANSUR FAHMI, supra note 4 at 136.  
/20/ Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of 
Sudan for Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, see United Nation 
Publication supra note 12 at 146. 
/21/ Art. 4 of 1959 Convention  
/22/ United Nation Publication Id at 50.  
/23/Id. at 51.  
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2.2.2. Meteorological and Hydrological Survey on the 
Equatorial Lakes HYDRO-MET 
The HYDROMET project included Egypt, Sudan, 
Uganda and Tanganyika.
24
 Later on, Burundi, Rwanda and 
Zaire joined the project, while Ethiopia remained as an 
observer.
25
 This project was a survey to the catchments of 
Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Mobutu SeseSeku (Lake 
Albert).
26
 The aim of the project was to help its members in: 
a) Determination of their equitable entitlements to the 
use of the Nile; 
b) Formulation of national water master plans; 
c) Development of their capacities and basin-wide 
information system; 
d) Preparation of a basin-wide institutional and legal 
arrangement; 
e) Enhancement of training procedures; 
f) Environmental impact assessment and water quality 
management capacity.
27
 
Some writers argue that the HYDROMET project is 
older than the PJTC.
28
They maintain that in 1950, Egypt 
agreed to work on a meteorological and hydrological 
survey on the equatorial lakes with the assistance of Great 
Britain. 
28
 However, official establishment of the 
HYDROMET project was in 1967, eight years after the 
1959 Convention.
29
 The project took about 35 years until it 
turned into TECCONILE. 
2.2.3. Technical Cooperation Committee for the 
Promotion of the Development and Environmental 
Protection of the Nile TECCONILE 
The Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion 
of the Development and Environmental Protection of the 
Nile was established in 1992. Rwanda, former Sudan, 
Tanzania, Zaire and Egypt established the TECCONILE for 
a fixed period of three years as a transition period until the 
establishment of a wide institutional arrangement. Some 
other Nile Basin states participated in the TECCONILE as 
observers like Ethiopia and Kenya.
30
 The main reason of 
the establishment of the TECCONILE was to address the 
Egyptian domination in the previous arrangement, 
especially in the UNDUGU. 
31
Brunnee and Toope saw that 
the Egyptian technical expertise gave it the upper hand in 
the previous institutional arrangement. This expertise 
threatened Ethiopia and Kenya. 
32
 The TECCONILE was 
supposed to work for only three years as a transition period 
                                                             
24meaningSalman M. Salman, The New State of South Soudan and the 
Hydir- Politics of the Nile Basin, 36WATER INT’L154, 159. {hereinafter 
The New State of South Soudan}.37 
/25/ Econ. & Soc. Commission For Western Asia, Assessment of Legal 
Aspects of the Management of Shared Water Resources in the ESCWA 
Region, ¶U.N. Doc. E/ESCW A/ENR/2001/3, (Feb. 22, 2001), 14.18.  
/26/The New State of South Soudan Supra note 23 at 37  
/27/ Supra note 25 at 19 
/28/ Id at 18.   
/29/ Id at 19  
/30/ Does the Law Matter, supra note 1 at 133-134  
/31/ Id at 133-134  
/32/ Does the Law Matter, supra note 1 at 133-134  
before launching the Nile Basin Initiative. However, this 
period was extended to more than nine years. 
2.2.4. UNDUGU: Brotherhood 
Another project that many writers did not give due 
attention was UNDUGU. Egypt was able to convene with 
Sudan, Uganda and Zaire to form a league called 
UNDUGU in 1981. UNDUGU means brotherhood in 
Swahili. The plan was to reorganize this convivial group 
into a more scientific organization. It was concerned with 
technical matters that ministers, who were concerned with 
political affairs, were not very interested in or 
knowledgeable about.
33
 
Mekonnen argued that both the UNDUGU and 
TECCONNILE paved the road to establish the NBI, which 
is considered to be a corner stone in the institutional 
arrangement of the Nile basin. However, many writers 
challenged this finding. Brunnee and Toope argued that the 
UNDUGU was an Egyptian initiative as a part of its 
“hegemonic aspirations.” 
34
 They further stipulated that 
Egypt “sought to create multi bargaining situations most 
likely to result in agreement than negotiations purely 
devoted to water issues.”
35
 
Additionally, YacobArsano argued that Ethiopia 
challenged the UNDUGU. He affirmed his argument that 
Ethiopia declared that UNDUGU had no legal foundation 
as a legitimate body, and it was ended after the “ministerial 
meeting in Addis Ababa.”
36
 However, TakeleSobokaBulto 
maintained Ethiopia was always against the Egyptian aims 
of the UNDUGU and TECCONILE, as it was acting in 
both as an observer. 
37
 Hence, there is mutual intention 
from both upper and lower riparian states to take a stand 
against each other, otherwise, these arrangements would 
have succeeded. 
2.2.5. Nile Basin Initiative 
Many writers argued that NBI is the successor of the 
TECCONILE.
38
 They maintained that NBI secretariat is 
housed in the old TECCONILE buildings. However, there 
are many differences between the NBI and TECCONILE.  
First, Ethiopia and Kenya did not join TECCONILE, while 
both of them are members of NBI. They declared their 
refutation of the TECCONILE on the bases of it not 
proviting any “fundamental equitable concerns of water 
apportionment.”
39
 Secondly, TECCONILE was to provide 
states with technical expertise, while NBI is to contribute to 
poverty alleviation, reverse environmental degradation and 
                                                             
/33/ Yosef Yacob, From UNDUGU to the Nile Basin Initiative, An Ending 
Exercise in Futility, Ethiopia TECOLAHACOS, 
http://www.tecolahagos.com/undugu.htm last visit 21 May 2012.   
/34/ See Does Law Matter supra note 1 at 133  
/35/ Id..at 133   
/ 36 / YacobArsano, Ethiopia and the Nile: Dilemmas of National and 
Regional Hydro politics, (2007), (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Zurich) 
(on file with author)  
/37/ see  Ambivalence and Necessity supra note 1 at 318.  
/38/ Does Law Matter supra note 7 at 108.  
/39/ Id at 134.   
 Journal of Water Resources and Ocean Science 2013; 2(5): 141-154 145 
 
promote socio-economic growth in the riparian countries.
40
 
The Nile Basin Initiative is a cornerstone in the overall 
Nile Basin relationship among the Nile basin states. They 
made such joint effort to “achieve sustainable socio-
economic development through the equitable utilization of, 
and benefit from, the common Nile Basin resources.”
41
 The 
Nile Basin Initiative was established on February 22, 1999 
in Darussalam, by the Ministers responsible for “Water 
Affairs of each of the nine Member States.” 
43
 These states 
are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
42
 
As of yet, there are no available resources about the 
membership or the position of South-Sudan. 
The significance of NBI was manifested in the attempt to 
reach a legal solution to the pending issues among the Nile 
Basin states. After one year of its official work, NBI 
prepared an “Agreement on the Nile River Basin 
Cooperative Framework.”
43
  The agreement was based on 
the scholarly work in the field of the international water law. 
It will pave the road to form the “Permanent River Nile 
Basin Organization” or the “Nile Basin Commission.” 
These arrangements will be concerned with the 
enforcement of any legal arrangement among the Nile 
Basin states. 
2.3. Pending Legal and Institutional Issues 
2.3.1. Legal Issues 
It should not be forgotten that the NBI had eventually 
reached a form of legal arrangement, an agreement on the 
Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework. Ethiopian 
scholars argued that such a framework would end the 
Egyptian hegemony on the Hydro-political aspects of the 
Nile water. Abadir Ibrahim argued that the new agreement 
would end the Egyptian hegemony unless upper riparian 
states use a counter hegemonic strategies, which will based 
on affect on the flow of the Nile to Egypt.
44
 However, such 
a perspective is more imaginary and lacks fundamental 
reading of the Agreement. Firstly, even though the 
Agreement did not answer the main question of States’ 
water share or distribution of water among them, it is based, 
to a great extent, on the international water law principles. 
Article 4, paragraph 2, about the Equitable and Reasonable 
Utilization, is a copy of the successive articles regarding 
                                                             
/40/see , Claudia Sadoff and David Grey, Beyond the River: The Benefits of 
Cooperation on International Rivers, 4 WATER POL’ 389, 2002, 401, see 
Nile Basin Initiative  
,http://nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=71%3Aabout-the-nbi&catid=34%3Anbibackground-
facts&Itemid=74&lang=enlast visit 10/3/2012 , .   
/41/ Samuel Luzi, Mohamed Abdel, MoghnyHamouda, FranziskaSigrist and 
EvelyneTauchnits, Water Policy Networks in Egypt and Ethiopia, 17 J. 
ENV.& DEV. 238, 2008, 239. 43 Nile Basin Initiative ,About the NBI, supra 
note 51 44 See Does Law Matter supra note 7 at 108.  
/42/ See Does Law Matter supra note 7 at 108. 
/43/ The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement, supra note 7.  
/ 44 / Abadier M. Ibrahim, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework 
Agreement: The Beginning of the End of Egyptian Hydro-Political 
Hegemony,18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV 284, 308  
the same issue. There are the works of the Helsinki Rules, 
the International Law Commission, Draft Articles of the 
United Nation Convention of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Water Course, and the recent development of 
the International Water Law represented in International 
Water Law Association conferences. 
Furthermore, the new viewpoints have introduced new 
standards to the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization and participation. Article 4 (2)(h) of the 
agreement regarding the equitable and reasonable 
utilization stated that “The contribution of each Basin State 
to the waters of the Nile River system”
45
 as one of the 
considerable measurement of the equitable utilization 
principle. This measurement was eliminated during the 
negotiation of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 
Additionally, Mekonnen argued that the main reason that 
kept Egypt and Sudan from joining the Agreement on the 
Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework was that a new 
term “water security” had been introduced in the draft.
46
 
This term led to the suspension of the draft articles, 
especially that of article 14.
47
  Article 14 made the 
interpretation of both principles of equitable utilization and 
no harm connected to the water security of the states. Egypt 
and Sudan did not accept this measure; instead, they 
proposed to connect the states’ water security with “current 
uses and rights of any other Nile basin state,”
48
 which was 
maintained in article 4 para 2.e “existing and potential uses 
of the water resources.” 
49
 
Moreover, in April 2010, Egypt maintained – in the 
Sharm Al Sheikha convention among the Nile Basin states - 
that the new Agreement shall include an article stating the 
Egyptian “Historical and Natural rights” in the Nile water. 
The Egyptian Minister of Water and Irrigation Dr. Hussein 
El Atafy made an official statement against the agreement 
on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework. He 
asserted that this Agreement “violates the agreed upon 
procedures and does not relieve member states of their 
commitments to valid previous agreements with Egypt.”
50
 
He further stipulated that “ the International Court of 
Justice considers these rights as enshrined as boarder 
agreements and those countries cannot change existing and 
valid agreement under the pretext that they were signed 
during the era of colonialism.”
51
 
Thirdly, Article 5 of the Agreement dealt with the 
principle of ‘Obligation not to cause Significant Harm.’ It 
stated that “Nile Basin States shall, in utilizing Nile River 
                                                             
/45/ Art.4 par. 2/h  
/46/ See The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations, 
Supra Note 7 at 428.  
/47 /Id at 428.  
/48/ Id at 428.  
/49/ Art.4 para 2/e.  
50 Egypt and its Historical Rights in Nile Water, Egypt State Information 
Service, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=1144 last 
visit 30/10/2012.  
/51 /Id.   
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System water resources in their territories, take all 
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant 
harm to other Basin States.”
52
 It also recognized the 
principle of reparation, as it claimed the right of the injured 
state which has sustained significant harm to ask for 
compensation for the act. The second paragraph stated that 
“{w}here significant harm nevertheless is caused to another 
Nile Basin State, the States … take all appropriate 
measures, having due regard to the provisions of Article 4 
above, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate 
or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss 
the question of compensation.”
53
 
2.3.2. Institutional Issues (Nile River Basin Commission) 
In addition to Nile River Basin, the Commission will 
succeed the NBI in all its purposes and functions. Article 
16 of the Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative 
Framework dealt with its own new purpose and objective 
of the Commission. It stated that it has three main 
objectives: 
a) Promote and facilitate the implementation of the 
principles, rights and obligations of the Agreement 
b) Serve as an institutional framework for cooperation 
among Nile Basin States in the use, development, 
protection, conservation and management if the 
Basin and its water 
c) Facilitate closer cooperation among states and 
peoples of the Nile River Basin in Social, 
economical, and culture fields. 
54
 
Besides the main objectives and purpose of the Nile 
River Basin Commission, it was given extra functions in 
regards to dispute settlements, information exchange, and 
mutual cooperation. Article 33 of the Agreement on the 
Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework gives the Nile 
River Basin Commission a reasonable role in dispute 
settlement. It urged the states’ members to use the Nile 
River Basin Commission as mediator or conciliator 
between the quarreled parties. 
3. Inadequacy of the Legal Framework 
of the Nile Basin 
3.1. Historical and Acquired Rights 
3.1.1. Egyptian Argument 
a. Mixing of Historical and Acquired Rights in the 
Egyptian Legal Literature 
Many writers in the field of international water law 
(Stephen McCafferey, Aziza Fahmy and MufidShehab) 
have intermixed the historical and the acquired rights. One 
can say that there is a general confusion in the legal 
literature of the Nile regarding the Historical and Acquired 
rights. However, these writers are justified in their 
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perspective, since most related conventions asserted 
Egypt’s historical rights. On the other hand, it is easy to 
find other writers confusing the two rights. Adel Aela 
declared that the Egyptian right is “Historical Acquired 
Rights,” as one terminology describes the Egyptian rights.
55
 
Egypt’s position has reached a stage that when talking of 
Egypt’s acquired rights is radically connected to its 
historical rights. 
i. Scope of the Egyptian Argument 
The structure of the legal argument related to the specific 
framework is categorized by opposing claims. Every state 
based its rights on the refutation of the rights of others. 
Egypt clings to its historical rights of 7000 years of Nile 
water utilization, as well as its acquired rights in the 
successive notes and conventions; conversely, Ethiopia 
refutes such rights. 
The Egyptian government argued that its water rights are 
based on factual and legal bases. For the factual dimension, 
Aziza Fahmi stated that according to the 1959 agreement 
Egypt only uses “55.5 milliard cubic meters out of total 200 
milliard cubic meters of water resources in the Nile 
basin.”
56
 She additionally maintained that Egypt “relies 
totally on the waters of the Nile for its existence, for its 
survival because it is an arid desert land.”
57
 Besides, Fahmi 
further stipulated that Egypt never used and it will never 
use the “right of veto”.
58
 She based her argument on “the 
principle of abuse of right,”
59
 the basic principle of State 
Responsibility that prevents any unreasonable use of the 
right of veto.
60
 Hence, she considered other Nile Basin 
states’ position against the Egyptian Nile share is an 
“exaggeration.”
61
 
For the legal dimension, Egypt built its legal argument 
on the successive legal notes and agreements. All of these 
maintained that the water should flow to the lower riparian 
states (Egypt and Sudan). There is no reference to the 
quantity of water specified to Egypt during such time. In 
1929-note exchange, Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha asserted 
the Egyptian historical rights, without any reference to such 
quantity.  The different rules and conventions held a clear 
position that none of them affect the existing bilateral or 
other agreements between states by any means. 
62
 Article 1 
of the 1966 Helsinki Accords stated that the “general rules 
of international law as set forth in these chapters are 
applicable to the use of the waters of an international 
drainage basin except as may be provided otherwise by 
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convention, agreement or binding custom among the basin 
States. 
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
paragraph 1, states that “{I}n the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary, nothing in the present Convention shall 
affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse state arising 
from agreements in force for it on the date on which it 
became a party to the present Convention.”
63
 
The rules, which were mentioned in the previous articles, 
are concealed with the general rules in the international law. 
However, any inequitable agreements, from the perspective 
of any party, will not be affected by the international water 
law rules. In the Nile case, these provisions will not affect 
the agreement of 1929 of between Egypt and Great Britain. 
Accordingly, Egyptian scholars argue that “Nile basin 
states had no legal ground to ask to modify any of the Nile 
River agreements or conventions.” 
ii. Counter Argument of Historical Rights 
On the other hand, other riparian states consider the 
Egyptian historical rights as a naïve excuse to get the lion’s 
share of the Nile Water.
64
 They respond to such an 
argument as it is considered prejudice to their water 
rights.
65
 For Ethiopia, the counter argument was based on 
its position against the 1902 Convention on the one hand, 
and other conventions and notes on the other. For the 1902 
Convention between Ethiopia and Great Britain, Ethiopia’s 
position can be summarized in three points. First, the 
Convention of 1902 between Great Britain and Ethiopia 
was never ratified. Second, all the previous conventions did 
not mention the Ethiopian share in the Nile water. Hence, 
these conventions are not mandatory to Ethiopia. Third, the 
British Declaration of adding the Ethiopian territory to the 
Italian colony cancelled all the conventions and agreements 
between Ethiopia and Great Britain.
66
 
Besides, scholars advocating the perspective of the lower 
riparian states have developed a counter argument against 
the rest of the Note and conventions. For the 1925 and 1929 
Exchange notes between Egypt and Great Britain, they 
argued that none of the Nile basin States were a member. 
Egypt only signed this Note with the colonist. In addition to 
the previous argument, they added to the 1959 Convention 
between Egypt and Sudan another a concrete counter 
argument. They argued that Egypt and Sudan did not have 
the right to distribute the Nile water share without referring 
to other riparian states. 
iii. Newly Independent States Unilateral Declaration 
The case of the unilateral declaration made by the Newly 
Independent state was mentioned in Geneva Convention on 
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Succession of States in respect of Treaties. The case that 
was mentioned in Article 9 only tackles specific case. It 
deals with affirmative action of newly independent state to 
accept the provisions of a agreement or convention, but the 
case of rejecting such an agreement or convention is remain 
unregulated. 
The first paragraph of Article 9 tackles the case of a 
unilateral declaration made by the successor state, 
providing the continuity of a treaty or a convention in favor 
of its territory. It stated that “Obligations or rights under 
treaties in force in respect of a territory at the date of a 
succession of States do not become the obligations or rights 
of the successor State or of other States Parties to those 
treaties by reason only of the fact that the successor State 
has made a unilateral declaration providing for the 
continuance in force of the treaties in respect of its 
territory.”
67
  The second paragraph of Article 9 it 
consequence of the previous act, it stated “the effects of the 
succession of States on treaties which, at the date of that 
succession of States, were in force in respect of the territory 
in question are governed by the present Convention.”
68
 This 
article was reflected in the ICJ judgment in the Nuclear Test 
Case. The ICJ dealt with the unilateral declaration from the 
French Republic to not participate in any future 
atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific area.
69
  The 
court stated that “{i}t is well recognized that declarations 
made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual 
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations.” 
71
 Then the court further declared that “When it is the 
intention of the State making the declaration that it should 
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers 
on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the 
Statebeing thenceforth legally required to follow a course 
of conduct consistent with the declaration.” 
iv. Tanzanian Argument 
The Egyptian government claims that the 1929 
Agreement is not only binding on Egypt, but also on Sudan, 
Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, on whose behalf the British 
signed the 1929 Agreement. However, these states are 
forced to abide by the Nyerere doctrine for state succession. 
This doctrine is considered as unique theory in the field of 
state succession.
70
 The two years grace period honored all 
treaty before its termination.
71
 
In 1962, the government of Tanzania sent the 
governments of Great Britain, Egypt, Kenya, Sudan and 
Uganda a memorandum regarding the utilization of the 
River Nile water. Mr. Nyerere sent his statement in the 
form of an exchange note to the Nile Basin States. Many of 
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the states remained silent towards the content of the 
Tanzanian memorandum. While Egypt responded, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Sudan remained silent. 
In 1963, the Egyptian government’s response was very 
simple. It did not argue the legality of the declaration; 
however, it stated that the provision of Exchange of Notes 
between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
and the Egyptian Government on the use of waters of the 
Nile for Irrigation would continue to exist until a new 
convention is drafted. 
3.2. Sovereignty versus Cooperation 
3.2.1. Conflict between Sovereignty and Cooperation  
a. Absolute Sovereignty 
In 1898, the Attorney General of the United States 
declared in his advisory opinion that “the rules, principles, 
and precedents of international law impose no duty or 
obligation upon the United States of denying to its 
inhabitants the use of the water of that part of the Rio 
Grande lying entirely within the United States, although 
such use results in reducing the volume of water in the river 
below the point where it ceases to be entirely within the 
United States.”
72
 These words were, according to most of 
international water legal scholars, the first pillar for 
Absolute Territorial Sovereignty.
73
 It was named after the 
American Attorney General Judson Harmon. He denied the 
riparian states’ rights over watercourse to allow the flow of 
water through its territory to other states. Harmon stated 
that the state department and the United States held no 
responsibility “for the substantial reduction in Rio Grande 
water available to Mexico.”
76
 
The previous theory about absolute territorial 
sovereignty was taken as a base to allow the “upstream 
states complete freedom of action with regard to 
international watercourses within its territory, irrespective 
of any consequence that might ensue in other countries.”
74
 
Besides, Ethiopian government adopts absolute territorial 
sovereignty theory. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1978 
issued serious of statements, in which it asserts and 
reserves “all the rights to exploit her natural resources.” 
75
 
Harmon Doctrine had become “a potent weapon in the 
hands of downstream states accusing an upstream state of 
acting unreasonable.”
76
 
The theory of absolute territorial integrity is for the sake 
of lower riparian states. As Stephan McCafferey stated 
“{w}hile the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty 
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insists upon the complete freedom of action of the upstream 
state, that of absolute territorial integrity maintains the 
opposite: that the upstream state may do nothing that might 
affect the natural flow of the water in the downstream 
state.”
77
 
It has been argued that this theory was never adopted in 
any diplomatic settlement, convention or court decision.
78
 
However, in the Nile case, the lower riparian states, 
especially Egypt, asserted their legal and historical rights to 
have a veto power over the utilization of the water of the 
Nile. This is based on the right of the lower riparian states 
to claim the right of continued, uninterrupted flow of the 
water to its territory from the upper riparian states. This 
theory gives a right to the lower riparian states to the water 
of the river.
79
 
This theory was criticized from various reasons. First, it 
ignores the equal territorial sovereignty of the state.
80
 
Stephan McCafferey described both theories as “factually 
myopic and legally anarchic.” McCafferey maintained that 
both theories “ignore other states’ need for and reliance on 
the waters of an international watercourse, and they deny 
that sovereignty entails duties as well as rights. As 
freshwater became increasingly precious and nations of the 
world ever more dependent, both doctrines became 
increasingly less relevant and defensible.”
81
 
Second, different courts and tribunals have declined this 
theory, as they considered it a prejudice against other states' 
rights.
82
 In Trail Smelter Case, a claim of water and air 
pollution was held against Canada from the United States.  
The court held Canada responsible “for extraterritorial 
injury existed as a matter of general international law.”
83
 
Third, in these two theories, harm is inevitable to either 
the upstream or the downstream states. The international 
law principles oblige states not to cause any harm to other 
states.
84
 Both theories violate the general legal rule that 
“one should use his property in such a manner as not to 
injure that of another,”
85
 or sic uteretuoutalienumnon 
laedas. The harm in these theories could mean a change in 
                                                             
/77/ Law of International Watercourse supra note 73 at 128.   
/ 78  /BONAYA GODANA, AFRICA’S SHARED WATER RESOURCES 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NILE, NIGER, AND  
SENEGAL RIVER SYSTEM, 39, (1985)  
/79/ Donald J. Chenevert, Supra note 160 at 502,  83 Donald J. Chenevert, 
Supra note 160 at 504.   
/80/ Donald J. Chenevert, Supra note 160 at 504.  
/81/ Law of International Watercourse supra note 73 at 128.   
/ 82 / Margaret J. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty: A 
Discussion of the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 191 2008, 
215.   
/83/ Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision (United States v. Canada), 33 A.J.I.L. 
182 (1939); 3 Int. Arb. Awards 1905, 1963 (1949).  
Mentioned in A.P. Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AM. J. 
INT’L L 828, 1963, 836.   
/ 84 / Salman M. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 
23 WATER RES. DEV. 625 (2007), 627  
/85/ It is the general rule in national and international law, article 5 of the 
Egyptian civil law asserted such right.  
 Journal of Water Resources and Ocean Science 2013; 2(5): 141-154 149 
 
the natural flow of the basin, which could affect the 
downstream states, or prevent the development of the 
international watercourse, which could also affect the 
upstream states.
86
 This has happened in the Nile case. 
While Ethopia builds a dam and starts its way of 
development, it will decrease the amount of water allocated 
to Egypt. Conversely, when Egypt maintains its share of the 
Nile water, it will handicap possibilities of development of 
Ethiopia. 
b. Limited Territorial Sovereignty 
Salman argued that the Limited Territorial Sovereignty 
principle ensures the equality of all riparian states in the use 
of the international river.
87
McCafferey reluctantly admitted 
that it is the dominant theory in the field of international 
water law in determining rights and obligations. 
(McCafferey:137) The principle of limited territorial 
sovereignty is based on the fact that: “all riparian states 
have the right to fully utilize the water of an international 
river. Besides, states are obliged to ensure that any use will 
not cause any significant harm to other riparian states. 
McCafferey described the theory as “{t}he freedom to 
swing one’s fist ends where the other person’s nose begins.” 
(McCafferey:137) 
The doctrine of Limited Territorial Sovereignty was 
strongly supported in many cases. The International Court 
of Justice  caseGabcikovo- Nagymaros gave  considerable 
weight to the principal of equitable and reasonable 
utilization of international watercourse. It stated that 
“Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a 
shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right 
to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural 
resources of the Danube … failed to respect the 
proportionality which is required by international law.”
88
 In 
the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice 
maintained that, “it is illegal for states to use or permit the 
use of their territories for acts that would constitute harm to 
persons or to the environment in other countries.”
89
 
In Lake Lanoux Arbitration, France declared that it 
would consider Spainish interests in the flow of the water 
to its territory unaffected by its hydroelectric project. Later 
on, France modified the amount of water used in the project, 
which Spain refused to accept. The tribunal answered the 
following question of whether or not the French act was a 
violation of the governing treaty and its protocol, which is 
the Treaty of Bayonne of 1866. The court concluded that 
“in the general accepted principles of international law, a 
rule which forbids a State, acting to protect its legitimate 
interests, from placing itself in a situation which enables it 
                                                             
/86/ Law of International Watercourse supra note 73 at 136.   
/87/ Law of International Watercourse supra note 73  at 627  
/88 /(Gabcikovo – Nagymaros) Project (Hungary/ Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ, 
25 September 1997, 56  
/ 89 / Corfu Channel Case ICJ, mentioned in Valentina OkaruBisant, 
Institutional and legal Frameworks for Preventing and Resolving Disputes 
Concerning the Development and Mangement of Africa’s Shared River 
Basins, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 331 1998, 352.  
in fact, in violation to its international obligations, to do 
even serious injury to a neighboring State.” 
Even with the wide acceptance of the principles of 
equitable utilization and no harm, major criticism to this 
doctrine is built on the wide disagreement of the essence of 
both principles. The detailed relationship between the two 
principles is complex and challenging.
90
 The international 
failure to reach an agreed text of both principles has 
deprived the limited territorial sovereignty from its content. 
As the criticism is directed to the application of the theory 
in the international water law principles, I shall refer to the 
next subsection, which deals with these principles. 
c. Community Theory 
Community Theory is based on the assumption that “the 
entire river basin is an economic unit, and the rights over 
the waters of the entire river are vested in the collective 
body of the riparian states, or divided among them either by 
agreement or on the basis of proportionality.”
91
 Even 
though this theory sounds new, its origins go back to 
Roman law. (McCafferey:149) Many philosophers wrote 
about the notion that “water is something to be treated as 
common property,” Grotius wrote: “a river … is the 
property of the people through whose territory it flows, … 
the same river viewed as a running water, has remained 
common property, so that any one may drink or drain water 
from it.”
92
 
Community Theory looks for maximum cooperation 
among states as a must on one hand; while on the other it 
overlooks the sovereignty principle. 
93
 The difference 
between the Community theory and the Limited Territorial 
sovereignty theory is that the first theory goes beyond the 
second, through increasing the rights of the collective body 
of the river concerned.
94
 
The idea of the Community theory was presented in the 
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of 
the River Oder. Even though this case was mainly about 
navigational uses, it is worth being presented for the 
concept of non-navigational uses. If this theory were 
applicable navigational uses, it would be also appropriate to 
present it. In the Commission of River Oder Case, the 
permanent Court of International Justice in its decision in 
1929 answered the question regarding the jurisdictions of 
the Oder Commission under Versailles Treaty, within the 
Polish territory to include also the Warta and Notze Rivers. 
The court found that Commission jurisdiction was entitled 
to both rivers. 
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4. Conflict between Sovereignty and 
Cooperation in IWL Principles 
4.1. Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization 
and Participation 
Articles four to eight in the second chapter of the 1966 
Helsinki Rules regulated the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization and participation. It holds the basin 
states responsible for “a reasonable and equitable share in 
the beneficial uses of the waters of an international 
drainage basin.”
95
 Article five; paragraph one defined the 
principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and 
Participation, as “it shall be determined in the light of all 
the relevant factors in each particular case.”
96
 
Article five, paragraph two stated that factors are 
considered in determining the reasonable and equitable 
share. These factors include but are not limited to 
geography, hydrology, climate affecting the basin, past 
utilization of the waters of the basin, and the economic, 
social, and population needs of each basin state. There is 
also the comparative costs of satisfying various needs, 
availability of other resources, avoidance of unnecessary 
waste in the utilization of waters of the basin, and 
practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-
basin states as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses.
97
 
On the other hand, the third paragraph of article six did not 
give any superiority to any of the previous factors over the 
other. 
98
 
Fairly similar to what Helsinki rules stated in Article V, 
the principle was mentioned in article 5 of the UN 
Convention.
99
 The International Law Commission tried to 
solve the problems that resulted from the conflict between 
the two principles of sovereignty and international 
cooperation. Article five introduced the concept of the 
‘equitable participation’, the main reason for which was to 
affirm that a system of equitable and reasonable utilization 
and participation cannot be achieved solely through one 
state. 
100
 
Article 6 stated the factors that affect the equitable and 
reasonable utilization and participation of the international 
basin.
101
This article increased the scope of the application 
of the equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 
of the international watercourse. These factors include (a) 
Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, 
ecological and other factors of a natural character; (b) 
Social and economic needs of the watercourse states 
concerned; (c) Populations dependent on the watercourse in 
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each state; (d) Effects of the use or uses of the watercourses 
in one watercourse state on other watercourse states; (e) 
Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (f) 
Conservation, protection, development and economy of use 
of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of 
measures taken to that effect; and (g) The availability of 
alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or 
existing use.
102
 
4.2. Principle of Obligation Not to Cause Significant 
Harm (Sic uteretuoutalienumnon laedas) 
One can argue that the Helsinki Rules of 1966 did not 
identify explicitly in their provisions an independent 
principle of obligation not to cause significant harm. It was 
only mentioned as part of the principle of equitable 
utilization and participation. However, the principle of no 
harm is an old and well-recognized principle in 
international law. In 1948, the International Court of Justice 
mentioned the no harm principle in the Corfu Channel case. 
Even though this case does not deal with the international 
watercourse or environmental damage, many scholars of 
international environmental law use it as an example of 
legal analysis.
103
 In this case, the ICJ maintained “every 
state's obligation is not to allow knowingly its territory to 
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”
104
 
The no harm principle is the most debatable in 
international water law. It is connected to articles 5 and 6, 
which were adopted during the negotiation process by a 
vote of 38 to 4, with 22 abstentions.
105
 The UN Convention 
on the Law of the Non Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses significantly added the principle of obligation 
not to cause significant harm to its provisions as an 
independent principle. Article 7, paragraph one stated that: 
“{w}atercoursestates shall, in utilizing an international 
watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate 
measures to prevent cause of significant harm to other 
watercourse states.”
106
 
The second paragraph made an important connection 
between the no harm principle and that of equitable 
utilization principle. These two principles are 
complementary. This claim is built on two bases: Firstly, 
McCafferey argued that the significant harm must be, in 
some cases, tolerated by harmed states. In many cases, the 
insignificant harm aims to achieve the overall regime of 
equitable utilization of the international watercourse.
107
 
Secondly, the determination of compensation shall be in 
light of two factors. In the case of a significant harm 
affecting a certain state, the negotiation to remedy such 
harm shall be based on the balance between the two 
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principles mentioned in articles 5, 6 and 7.
108
 
The no harm and equitable utilization principles went 
side by side in more than five places in the UN Convention. 
Firstly, they were mentioned in the second paragraph of 
article 10 (relationship between different kinds of uses). 
Secondly, article 15 dealt with the reply of notification. 
Thirdly, article 16 tackled the absence of reply to 
notification. Fourthly, article 17 dealt with consultations 
and negotiations concerning planned measures. Fifthly, 
article 19 regulated the urgent implementation of planned 
measures), all these articles referred to article 5 (Principle 
of Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation), 
and article 7 (Principle of obligation not to cause 
significant harm) as one unit. 
Helsinki Rules addressed the no harm obligation through 
the factors for determining the reasonable and equitable 
utilization. The UN Convention followed the same 
approach of Helsinki Rules. It separated the no harm 
principle in one article titled “principle of obligation not to 
cause significant harm” from the equitable utilization 
principle.  The commentary of Article 12 stipulated that the 
change in the formulation was to “resolve the most 
debatable issues in the drafting of the UN Convention: the 
relationship between the principle of equitable utilization 
and the obligation not to harm another basin state (Article 
16).” 
109
 The current text reflects the right to an equitable 
and reasonable share of the water of an international 
drainage basin, in addition to compliance with the equitable 
and reasonable utilization with the obligation not to cause 
significant harm to another basin state. 
110
 
Article 16 dealt with the “Avoidance of Trans-boundary 
Harm.”  Article 16 set the states’ obligation to “refrain from, 
and prevent acts or omissions within their territory that 
cause significant harm to another basin state having due 
regard for the right of each basin state to make equitable 
and reasonable use of the waters.” This article is just a 
reflection of the legal rule to “do not use your property so 
as to injure the property of another.”
111
 The Commentary of 
Article 16 refers to the debates regarding the no harm 
principal, and state liability of harm caused from its actions. 
The commentary looked at the principles as part of the 
customary law, withdoubt. It stated that “{d}espite the 
considerable controversy over the application of the "no 
harm" rule and its relation to the rule of equitable use found 
in art. 5 of the UN Convention, there actually is little 
controversy over whether the principle expressed in art. 7 is 
(sic) part of customary international law.” 
112
 
4.3. Principle of General Obligation to Cooperate 
                                                             
/108 /Stephan C. McCaffrey, Introduction, Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, United Nation 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, 
untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.htmllast visit 10/3/2012.   
/109/ International Law Association, Berlin Conference, Water Resources 
Committee, 71 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. CONF. 334 2004, 362  
/110/ Id at 362  
/111/ Id at 362  
/112/ Id at 363  
International scholars consider the cooperation principle 
as an "umbrella term" rather than a strictly legal duty.
113
 
Any international river can be a source of good relation and 
cooperation on one hand; while a source of tension and 
conflict on the other.
114
 Tension could result from the use of 
sovereign states of the international watercourse. In order 
to preserve the utility of the international watercourse, 
states shall participate in a cooperative framework.
115
 On 
the other hand, the general principle of international duty to 
cooperate among states is just a general obligation, as there 
are no prescribed or specific obligations.
115
 There is 
struggle between the general principle of international duty 
to cooperate among states - as an international necessity to 
preserve the existence of the international society- and the 
principle of sovereignty. States always need to cooperate, to 
preserve their existence, while reserving their right of 
sovereignty. The authority of the state ends at a designated 
point on land, as well as in the water.
116
 
It may be argued that the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and 
their supplements contained many provisions that 
encourage states to cooperate in the allocation, 
management, and preservation of internationally shared 
waters.
117
 Nevertheless, the principle of general obligation 
to cooperate was first introduced as a separate principle in 
the UN Convention, as article 8 held a general obligation 
on all riparian states to cooperate in order to reach the 
maximum benefit of the Basin. The general obligation of 
cooperation was based on four factors: sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith.
118
 The 
good faith factor was not introduced in early negotiations 
of the UN Convention.
119
 All the three factors are attached 
to the sovereign state. One of the major contributions of the 
special rapporteur Mr. Stephan McCaferrey, was 
introducing the ‘good faith’ factor,
120
 which is currently 
embedded in many international cases. The North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases maintained that there is an 
international obligation on states to resolve their 
delimitation through justice and good-faith..
121
This 
obligation mandates reaching a satisfactory result without 
any prejudice against sovereign states. 
122
 
Unlike the UN Convention, Article 11 limited the 
                                                             
/113/ Id at 361  
/114/ see  Beyond the River, supra note 40 at 389 115 Id at 391  
/115/ Supra note 107 at 361  
/ 116 /Preliminary Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, Law of the non-navigational uses of 
International watercourses, ¶ U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/393 (July 5, 1985) 
(prepared by Stephen McCaffrey)  
/117/ Supra note at 107 at 361  
/118 /Art. 8 Id  
/119/ First report on the law of the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses, Law of the non-navigational uses of International 
watercourses, ¶ U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/367 and Corr.1 (April 19, 1983) 
(prepared by J. Evensen), 174/108  
/120/ Stephen McCaffrey, sixth report on the law of the non-navigational 
uses of international water courses, Special Rapporteur 
/ 121 / North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Denmark), 1986, I.C.J.  46/47, Judgement.  
/122/ Id  
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cooperation framework to only one factor, ‘good faith.’
123
 It 
stated that “{b}asin states shall cooperate in good faith in 
the management of waters of an international drainage 
basin for the mutual benefit of the participating states.”
124
 
5. Conclusion 
After the analysis of the legal and institutional 
frameworks of the Nile Basin, it is hard to rely on such 
frameworks fora working plan. The future convention or 
even the current agreement should be founded on the basis 
of needs, identified and expressed by the various states. 
Egypt has to fully understand that unilateral action will not 
be efficient, and that Egypt is not the sole decision maker 
within the basin states, if it wishes to consume the same 
amount of the Nile share. The problem of the Nile will only 
be solved through unanimous agreement to negotiate and 
reach an understanding. Any other suggested solution, other 
than the previouslystated, will cost Egypt a tremendous 
amount of money, time and effort. Despite the fact that the 
conflict looks legal atface value, it is in fact a conflict of 
interest. Additionally, if Basin countries had really intended 
to solvethe problem, they would have relentedand sought 
international courts and tribunals decades ago. Finally the 
thesis proposed a simple solution to the problem, which 
was proposed by the various parties of the problem many 
times in the past. 
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